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Nic takiego nie mówił.
"jaką poznałeś info o technicznych warunkach KwS"
A co to takiego "techniczne warunki katastrofy"?
2. Заход по КГС в директорном режиме. (CATI – 60x800 or 60x550)
3. Заход по КГС в автоматическом режиме. (depends on cat, can be CATIIIB – 0x50)
4. Заход по ОСП. (120x1500)
5. Заход по ОСП с использованием ОРЛ-А. (120x1500)
6. Заход по РСП. (Radar APP, 60x800)
7. Заход по РСП + ОСП. (60x800)
8. Заход по ОПРС. (one separate NDB) (200x2000)
9. Заход по VOR/DME. (100x1000 or 250x2500)
10. Заход визуальный. (Visual) (200x2000)
ОСП = 2 xNDB (non-directional beacons, LF/MF) (DPRM + BPRM) - 2xARK (= ADF) required.
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Smolensk-Severnyj (XUBS) IAC-chart RWY26 (dated 12Apr2005), most probably obsolete but gives:
ОСП РСП РМС 15п
РСБН 13н
which means there is (have been at least):
-- 2xNDB plus radar (#7 above)
-- RSBN (ch 13) for positioning in “Krug” (rectangular circuit), to be coupled with PRMG (ch 15) for precision electronic course + GP
(these both are Soviet UHF type systems now in big problems internationally as they are conflicting with mobile phones - PRMG is pure a Mil-type landing system, seldom even directly mentioned).
РМС in this case is a special way to introduce a “radiomayachnaya” landing system.
No mention in IAC chart of ОРЛ-А -- Airport Surveillance Radar (part of РСП?).
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Mention of “markers” in this case is hardly appropriate, since marker ground antennas seen in Amelin et al photos most probably are part of PRMG (not any “ILS” type). While with carrier fq of 75 MHz, PRMG markers are differently audio modulated: outer MKR = 3000Hz dashes, while middle MKR = 3000 Hz dots. So, using Jeppesen type LMM & LOM not very appropriate.
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In “Stenogramma 101” the “beep sound” 845 Hz (10:39:50,2) = DPRM id (OK 310), while 800 Hz (10:40:56,0) = BPRM id (O 640).
Several typing and other errors corrected ... dont wish to interfere nice discussions in any way....
The best analysis available so far indicates an almost linear descent from 4km to first impact at about 1.1km. Even if giving ATC the privilage to chose any fixed angle as the glideslope, still only one of the points (4km, 3km and 2km) may have been actually "on glideslope", with one high or low, and at least one completely out of tolerance.
However even more interesting I find the time differences here. Looking at the CVR transcript, we can see the following:
39:50.2 00.0 Outer marker (6.1km)
40:13.5 +23.5 ATC: 4..
40:26.6 +13.1 ATC: 3..
40:38.7 +12.1 ATC: 2..
40:56.0 +17.3 Inner marker (1.1km)
Sec/km, from outer to inner marker:
11.75
11.75
13.1
12.1 So far an average of 12.2 sec/km
19.2 7.0 sec/km extra. Or 158%. (From 2km to inner marker 1.1km)
To burn up this amount of time in 900m would simply be impossible. It did not happen. What does this mean? Clearly the calls of 4km, 3km and 2km were given by ATCO several seconds too early. Or in distance.. about 400-600m too early.
It is hence possible that the crew were evaluating their heights rather correctly, in respect to the distance from runway they were given. When the last "100" was called by navigator (or automatic?) , they would then believe that they were almost out of the ravine.. Hence pretty much on glideslope. The "100" was called at 1750m, but if they were "feeling the time", or in other way using it for navigational plot, from ATC notified "2km", then they would believe they were around 1150-1250m. Hence in perfect position for their height, and at a point where RA should have been off my no more than 15-20m. So they would believe they were at 80-85m, but they were actually at 50m. Or similarly, when at 1600m, they could believe they were at 1000m, past the ravine completely. While they were actually just over the bottom of it.
As for the ATC radar display. Assuming they had no LCD but rather the most simple available, the flight path would look something like this, with the black line drawn by operator as a help line for the minimum acceptable height:
While I'm not a conspiracy theorist, I can't avoid to make the objective realization, that it must be extremely simple, both in technology and practice, to fix this equipment to show an imaginary "on slope" aircraft path/signal at the time of this incident, with the ATCO completely unaware. But that is useless to discuss, as no evidence may ever confirm it. So, assuming the display showed what is indicated, I can't really see how he can call "on glideslope".
Wskazałem jedyną możliwą przyczynę zablokowania ABSU - niewłaściwy prąd zasilania modułu SAU, ale jakoś nikt nie zwrócił na to uwagi...
"Co to jest "low speed digital ILS" zapisany w logach TAWS ?"
https://books.google.pl/books?id=MgvsCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=low+speed+digital+ILS&source=bl&ots=i4cLqEeYUG&sig=SB-gn1c0Czg_TY99DKq_H1YplMQ&hl=pl&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwibg4_9nqrNAhXiB5oKHfcvC9YQ6AEIPTAE#v=onepage&q=low%20speed%20digital%20ILS&f=false
To do czego się odnosisz też ma mało wspólnego z "low speed ILS" :)
Chodziło ci o "For this configuration the source for localizer deviation is the low-speed digital ILS receiver"?
To jest jedynie informacja o źródle odniesienia ;)
Ale nie widzisz różnicy pomiędzy "low speed ILS", a "low-speed digital ILS receiver"???